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Mr. Chairman, Senator Boxer, distinguished members of the sub-committee, I thank you for the opportunity to testify today on a matter of great importance to the United States and the entire international community. I would ask that my full testimony is submitted for the record but I will make some short remarks here on the strategy of UN military operations – that is, the level at which the political and military dimensions of peacekeeping meet. In the course of my work I studied some 50 UN and other multinational peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. The lessons learned from those missions give us a fairly good idea of the challenges of these missions and the institutional competence and capabilities of the UN itself.

As the sub-committee is well aware, today we sit on the cusp of a periodic upswing in the size, character, and ambitions of UN peacekeeping operations. Since last fall the UN has mandated three large and complex peacekeeping operations - in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo - in which the UN itself will direct significant military forces operating in some difficult environments. In addition of course, there is the fairly new UN mission to Kosovo, but in that mission NATO is handling the military tasks while the UN restricts itself to policing, administrative, and other basic governmental functions.

I say periodic upswing because a survey of the 52-year history of UN peacekeeping shows that it goes in cycles. I'd like briefly to discuss these cycles in order better to understand where we might be headed now. My study shows that UN peacekeeping goes through recurrent phases – and the pattern has been repeated several times in the past half-century. In the first phase small peacekeeping successes lead an emboldened international community to give the UN larger, more complex, and ambitious military operations in more belligerent environments. In the second phase these sorts of operations quickly overwhelm the capabilities of the UN itself, which tries unsuccessfully to improvise in operations for which it has no institutional structure, authoritative management systems, or military competency. In the third phase, burned and discredited, the UN pulls back to a more traditional peacekeeping role that suits the institution. Finally, with time healing some of these wounds and challenges to the international community continuing to mount, short memories compel the international community to thrust the UN back onto the international security stage in a more ambitious and central role than before.

The lessons of each of these cycles are clear. The UN itself has never had, nor was it ever intended to have, the authority, institutions, and procedures needed to successfully manage complex military operations in dangerous environments. Conversely, the UN – the world's most accepted honest broker - has exactly the characteristics needed to manage some peacekeeping operations undertaken in supportive political environments. Even then, the UN has struggled to competently direct even small and innocuous operations. But the real problems for all involved have come when the international community puts the UN in a military role for which is neither politically suited nor strategically structured. My book goes into great detail on exactly why the UN has shown – in almost 50 missions – that there are strict limits to its military role. Quite simply, the UN should not be in the business of running serious military operations –

it has neither the legitimacy, authority, nor systems of accountability needed to build the means necessary to direct significant military forces.

Authoritative, specifically structured, and well-rehearsed military alliances or coalitions of the willing better manage multinational military operations of the sort we've recently seen in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Africa led by a major military power. These sorts of organizations are specifically structured – legally, politically, and organizationally – to direct complex and coercive military operations in uncertain environments. The model we've seen in Kosovo and East Timor recently may work best. An alliance like NATO or a multinational coalition such as that Australia led in East Timor can do the heavy lifting before turning it over to the UN.

Mr. Chairman, let me briefly summarize how these cycles have occurred and in particular the U.S. and UN role in them. In my full testimony I have the complete story of the most recent cycle – that of Somalia and Bosnia – and perhaps in questioning we can discern from those episodes lessons for these new missions on the horizon.

In 1948/49, UN peacekeeping started with relatively innocuous missions to Palestine and India-Pakistan - missions which, we should note, are still in existence today. A largely successful peacekeeping mission in the Sinai in the 1950's encouraged the UN to mount a very ambitious mission to the Congo in 1960. That mission ended very badly, taking the life of some 234 Blue Helmets and the Secretary-General. It is still referred to by many as "the UN's Vietnam."

Chastened, the international community returned to what was emerging as a more tried and true formula for UN peacekeeping. Small, lightly armed, and relatively unambitious missions deployed after a peace was concluded. These Blue Helmets did best when they followed the so-called principles of peacekeeping: strict neutrality, passive military operations, and the use of force only in self-defense. Importantly, the UN recognized that the Blue Helmets were only supporting players, there to help belligerents that had agreed to the UN presence. UN peacekeeping was never intended to be a coercive military instrument – one that could force a solution on one side or another to a conflict. This role for the UN, which is not specifically referred to in the Charter (nor envisaged by the UN's founders) evolved over time – the nature of the technique (peacekeeping) uniquely suiting the character and management abilities of the institution (the UN).

By late 1980's, the UN's ability to manage a small number of peacekeeping operations was not in doubt. In fact, in 1988 The Blue Helmets were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. We should remember that in 1988 UN peacekeeping represented a rather small and unambitious enterprise in the grand scheme of global security. In January of 1988 the UN was managing less than 10,000 troops in five long-running peacekeeping missions and on an annual peacekeeping budget of some $230 million. The U.S. then, as now, picked up about 1/3rd the cost of those missions.

Things changed quickly though after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The thawing of the Cold War and the unprecedented cooperation shown by the Security Council during the Persian Gulf War presaged a new era of UN-sponsored collective security. The enthusiasm for more and newer forms of UN peacekeeping was quickly manifested in a series of ambitious, expensive, dangerous, and militarily complex missions. By 1993, the UN was managing almost 80,000 peacekeepers in eighteen different operations, including large and heavily armed missions to Cambodia, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia. The annual peacekeeping budget grew to $3.6 billion.

Less than two years on from that peak however, UN peacekeeping had been thoroughly discredited. The Blue Helmets' failure to halt political violence in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia was reinforced by images of peacekeepers held hostage in Bosnia, gunned down in Mogadishu, or butchered along with thousands in Kigali. The UN quickly retreated - turning a nascent peacekeeping mission in Haiti over to a U.S.-led coalition, passing Bosnia off to NATO, and leaving Somalia to slip back into chaos. By 1997, UN peacekeeping was down to a more manageable level of some 15,000 Blue Helmets operating in more mundane environments and on a budget of around $1.2 billion. All has been relatively quiet on the UN front until this past fall, when Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Congo sprang onto the scene. If those missions go forward as planned, they will add over 25,000 Blue Helmets and some $700 million - $1 billion in costs to the UN's plate. More important, several of these new missions, especially Sierra Leone and the Congo, look certain to take place in very uncertain and belligerent environment – the sort in which the UN rarely if ever succeeds.

Mr. Chairman, a word on the U.S. role in this latest cycle – the rise and fall of UN peacekeeping in the six years after the end of the Cold War. This message I believe is critical for the U.S. policy community because our own actions drive these episodes as much as anything else. More coherence in U.S. policy could have prevented many of the recent disasters in places such as Somalia and Bosnia. While a broad range of observers drew the same basic conclusion from peacekeeping's recent past - that the UN should not be in the business of managing complex, dangerous, and ambitious military operations - most are split on how it happened and whom to blame. Conservatives in the United States charge the UN itself and especially a fiendishly ambitious Boutros Boutros-Ghali who tried openly to accrue more and more military legitimacy and power for the UN itself. Liberal internationalists blame a parochial U.S. Congress that pulled the U.S. out of Somalia at the first sign of trouble, and is now holding America's UN dues hostage to its provincial agenda.

Both views are off base. Ironically, those who put UN peacekeeping through the wringer and hung the organization and its last Secretary-General out to dry were those American internationalists most likely to promote a larger collective security role for the United Nations. Over the past seven years, American officials sought for the UN a much greater role in international security affairs. But even though they were philosophically amenable to that goal, they choose to propel the UN into uncharted waters more out of political expediency

rather than as a carefully crafted manifestation of their predisposition towards collective security. In many cases a new role for the UN was not so much a matter of policy, but a way of avoiding hard policy decisions such as those concerning the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. In essence, we used the UN as an excuse, not a strategy.

Either way, American officials, especially in the first Clinton administration, pushed a reluctant UN into much greater military roles than it could hope to handle. Once its failures were manifest, the same officials joined in the conventional wisdom that the UN itself "tried to do too much." Because of this any post-Cold War "advances" in collective security were negated by those very internationalists who were so keen to champion the UN. As Paul Kennedy and Bruce Russett warned, UN operations such as those to Bosnia and Somalia "far exceed the capabilities of the system as it is now constituted, and they threaten to overwhelm the United Nations and discredit it, perhaps forever, even in the eyes of its warmest supporters." What they did not consider was that some of the UN's "warmest supporters" were those who were most responsible for putting it in desperate straits in the first place.

Patterns of Abuse

Advocates of collective security were almost giddy in the months immediately following the Gulf War. As David Henrickson noted, the end of the Cold War and the Security Council's role in the Gulf War "have produced an unprecedented situation in international society. They have persuaded many observers that we stand today at a critical juncture, one at which the promise of collective security, working through the mechanism of the United Nations, might at last be realized." Think tanks, conferences, workshops, and task-force reports trumpeting a proactive military role for the UN proliferated. In January 1992, the first every Security Council summit declared that "the world now has the best chance of achieving international peace and security since the foundation of the UN." The heads-of-state asked Secretary General Boutros-Ghali to prepare a report on steps the UN could take to fulfill their expectations of a more active military role.

In Boutros-Ghali's subsequent An Agenda for Peace, he outlined a series of proposals that could take the UN well beyond its traditional military role of classic peacekeeping. The Secretary-General called not only for combat units constituted under the long moribund Article 43 of the UN Charter, but for "peace-enforcement" units "warranted as a provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter." Although these were largely theoretical and untested ideas, by the time they were published in July 1992, the Security Council had already implemented a similar agenda. A few months prior to An Agenda for Peace, large and ambitious UN missions to the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia were already approved and underway.

This initial episode reflected a pattern that would develop over the next several years. The UN, many times reluctantly so, would be thrust into an ambitious and dangerous series of missions and operations by a Security Council that was enthusiastic about new and enlarged mandates for UN peacekeepers - but not so keen on providing the support necessary to make

them a success. In 1992, while the Secretary-General was (at the request of the world's most powerful leaders) preparing a draft report on possible new departures in peacekeeping, a series of international crises plunged the organization into what UN official Shashi Tharoor called "a dizzying series of peacekeeping operations that bore little or no resemblance in size, complexity, and function to those that had borne the peacekeeping label in the past."

In the former Yugoslavia, it soon became painfully obvious that despite the deployment of almost 40,000 combat troops, the UN was in over its head. Among American leaders, it was fashionable in both political parties to bemoan the ineffectiveness of the UN peacekeepers. This America was as responsible for what the UN was attempting to do in the former Yugoslavia as any other state or the organization itself. Between September 1991 and January 1996, the Security Council passed 89 resolutions relating to the situation in the former Yugoslavia, of which the United States sponsored one-third. While Russia vetoed one resolution and joined China in abstaining on many others, the United States voted for all 89 to include those twenty resolutions that expanded the mandate or size of the UN peacekeeping mission in the Balkans.

Far from the notion that the UN was pulling the international community into Bosnia, the U.S.-led Security Council was pushing a reluctant UN even further into a series of missions and mandates it could not hope to accomplish. Boutros-Ghali warned the members of the Security Council that "the steady accretion of mandates from the Security Council has transformed the nature of UNPROFOR's mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina and highlighted certain implicit contradictions…..The proliferation of resolutions and mandates has complicated the role of the Force." His under Secretary-General for peacekeeping, Kofi Annan, was more direct. Attempts to further expand the challenging series of missions being given to the UN were "building on sand."

This did not seem to deter the U.S.-led Security Council however, which was happy to expand the mission further while volunteering few additional resources to the force in Bosnia. A June 1993 episode demonstrating this pattern is instructive. Then, the UN field commander estimated he would need some 34,000 more peacekeepers to protect both humanitarian aid convoys and safe areas in Bosnia. The Security Council, having given him these missions in previous resolutions, instead approved a "light option" of 7,600 troops, of whom only 5,000 had deployed to Bosnia some nine months later. Quitting his post in disgust, the Belgian general in command remarked "I don't read the Security Council resolutions anymore because they don't help me."

The Clinton administration, which had shown unbounded enthusiasm for UN peacekeeping in the first months of the administration, began to sour slightly on its utility by September 1993. By then Ambassador Madeline Albright's doctrine of "assertive multilateralism" had given way to President Clinton beseeching the UN General Assembly to know "when to say no." But it was the United States and its allies on the Security Council who kept saying yes for the United Nations. Even after that speech, Mrs. Albright voted for all five

subsequent resolutions (and sponsored two) that again expanded the size or mandate of the UN peacekeeping mission to the former Yugoslavia. All the while, until the fall of 1995, the U.S. steadfastly resisted participating in the UN mission or intervening itself with military forces through some other forum.

In Somalia, there was an even more direct pattern. There the United States pushed an unwilling UN into a hugely ambitious nation-building mission. In its waning days the Bush administration had put together a U.S.-led coalition that intervened to ameliorate the man-made famine in Somalia. From the very beginning of the mission it had been the intention of the U.S. to turn the operation over to a UN peacekeeping force. Conversely, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, an Egyptian well acquainted with the challenge of nation-building in Somalia, wanted no part of the mission for the UN. Ambassador Robert Oakley, the U.S. envoy to Somalia, noted that in a meeting with the Secretary-General and his assistants on 1 December 1992, "the top UN officials rejected the idea that the U.S. initiative should eventually become a UN peacekeeping operation."

The U.S. kept up the pressure on the Secretary-General, who was powerless to resist the idea if it gained momentum in the Security Council. The debate resembled what Chester Crocker called "bargaining in a bazaar" and "raged out of public view" while the U.S. and the UN negotiated over the follow-on mission. For his part, Boutros-Ghali wanted the U.S.-led coalition to accomplish a series of ambitious tasks before the UN would take over. These included the establishment of a reliable cease-fire, the control of all heavy weapons, the disarming of lawless factions, and the establishment of a new Somali police force. For its part, the United States just wanted to leave Somalia as soon as possible. It was now time to put assertive multilateralism to the test. Madeline Albright shrugged off the challenge to the world body and wrote that the difficulties that the UN was bound to encounter in Somalia were "symptomatic of the complexity of mounting international nation-building operations that included a military component."

The debate, with Boutros-Ghali resisting up to the last, effectively ended on 26 March 1993 with the passage of Security Council resolution 814 establishing a new UN operation in Somalia. The resolution authorized, for the first time, Chapter VII enforcement authority for a UN-managed force. More importantly, the resolution greatly expanded the mandate of the UN to well beyond what the American force had accomplished. Former Ambassador T. Frank Crigler called the UN mandate a "bolder and broader operation intended to tackle underlying social, political, and economic problems and to put Somalia back on its feet as a nation." In the meantime, the U.S. withdrew its heavily armed 25,000 troop force and turned the baton over to a lightly armed and still arriving UN force. The transition, set for early May 1993, was so rushed that on the day the UN took command its staff was at only 30 percent of its intended strength. The undermanned and underequipped UN force was left holding a bag not even of its own making.

The travails of the UN mission in Somalia need no further elucidation here. Suffice it to say that the U.S., although no longer a direct player in Somalia, continued to lead the Security Council in piling new mandates on the UN mission there. The most consequential of these was the mandate to apprehend those Somali's responsible for the June 1993 killing of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers. The U.S. further complicated this explosive new mission with an aggressive campaign of disarmament capped by the deployment of a special operations task force that was to lead the manhunt for Mohammed Farah Aideed. This task force was not under UN command in any way and when it became engaged in the tragic Mogadishu street battle of 3 October 1993 the UN commanders knew nothing of it until the shooting started. Even MG Thomas Montgomery, the American commander and deputy UN commander, was told of the operation only 40 minutes before its launch. A U.S. military report afterward noted that the principal command problems of the UN mission in Somalia were "imposed on the U.S. by itself."

This fact, that the UN was not involved in the deaths of eighteen American soldiers in Mogadishu, was buried by the administration. Even more cynically, several top-level administration officials charged in 1995 with selling the Dayton Peace Accords to a skeptical U.S. public constantly noted that U.S. soldiers in the NATO mission to Bosnia would not be in danger because the UN would not be in command, as it was in Somalia. Few single events have been as damaging to the UN's reputation with the Congress and American public as the continued perception that it was the United Nations that was responsible for the disaster in Somalia. Not only has this myth been left to fester, it was indirectly used, along with the UN's many other U.S.-initiated problems, to call for Boutros Boutros-Ghali's head during the 1996 Presidential campaign. Then, for the first time in several years, the U.S. used its veto to stand alone against the Security Council and bring down the Secretary-General who had resisted the U.S.-led events that so discredited him and his organization.

Conclusion - Friends Like These

After those particular episodes, UN peacekeeping is now happy to be, as a UN official recently told me, in "a bear market." Congress and the Administration are happy as well with a low profile for UN military operations - especially as Clinton officials try to get Congress to pay America's share of the unprecedented peacekeeping debt. Fittingly, Madeline Albright, as Secretary of State, is now chiefly responsible for convincing Congress to pay the bill that she is tacitly accountable for because of her votes during that busy time on the Security Council.

Albright also played a central role as the official, more than any other in the Bush and Clinton administrations, who epitomized the keen hopes of liberal internationalists advocating a greater security role for the UN. In early 1993, her speeches were laced with talk of "a renaissance for the United Nations" and ensuring that "the UN is equipped with a robust capacity to plan, organize, lead, and service peacekeeping activities." By 1994, however, after it because obvious that the inherent limitations of a large multinational organization would not allow it effectively to manage complex military operations, Albright stated that "the UN has not

yet demonstrated the ability to respond effectively when the risk of combat is high and the level of local cooperation is low." Left unsaid was that the U.S., more than any other member state, was responsible for giving the UN much to do in Somalia and Bosnia and little to do it with. It appeared, as Harvey Sicherman has written, that "the assertive multilateralists of 1992 -3 placed more weight upon the UN than it could bear, while ignoring NATO and other regional coalitions."

Regional coalitions or more narrowly focused military alliances were ignored both for reasons of philosophy and political expediency. Philosophically, legitimacy could be gained for collective security in general and the UN in particular by having it directly manage the more dynamic military operations of the post-Cold War era. Thomas Weiss typified this school of thought and wrote, "the UN is the logical convenor of future international military operations. Rhetoric about regional organizations risks slowing down or even making impossible more timely and vigorous action by the UN, the one organization most likely to fulfill adequately the role of regional conflict manager." This appealed in particular to the officials of the Clinton administration who had developed and published many similar thoughts while in academia or the think-tank world.

But for the most part the U.S. promoted unprecedented UN missions to conflicts such as Bosnia and Somalia because they did not want the U.S. or its alliances to be principally responsible for difficult and protracted military operations in areas of limited interest. As Shashi Tharoor wrote, "it is sometimes argued that the peacekeeping deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina reflected not so much a policy as the absence of policy; that [UN] peacekeeping responds to the need to 'do something' when policy makers are not prepared to expend the political, military, and financial resources required to achieve the outcome that the press and opinion leaders are clamoring for."

The final irony is that the UN's adventurous new role in 1993 - 1995 and peacekeeping's subsequent demise came about not necessarily by the well intentioned but unsupported design of collective security's most ardent proponents. Instead, it came about by default as these same supporters thrust upon the UN difficult missions they would rather not have addressed more directly. Given the recent and renewed enthusiasm for more missions of the sort that will greatly challenge the UN, the international community would do well to keep this lesson in mind.